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Problem definition: The beer game is a widely used game that is played in supply chain management
classes to demonstrate the bullwhip effect and the importance of supply chain coordination. The game is
a decentralized, multi-agent, cooperative problem that can be modeled as a serial supply chain network
in which agents choose order quantities while cooperatively attempting to minimize the network’s total
cost, even though each agent only observes its own local information. Academic/practical relevance: Under
some conditions, a base-stock replenishment policy is optimal. However, in a decentralized supply chain in
which some agents act irrationally, there is no known optimal policy for an agent wishing to act optimally.
Methodology: We propose a reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm, based on deep Q-networks, to play
the beer game. Our algorithm has no limits on costs and other beer game settings. Like any deep RL
algorithm, training can be computationally intensive, but this can be performed ahead of time; the algorithm
executes in real time when the game is played. Moreover, we propose a transfer-learning approach so that
the training performed for one agent can be adapted quickly for other agents and settings. Results: When
playing with teammates who follow a base-stock policy, our algorithm obtains near-optimal order quantities.
More importantly, it performs significantly better than a base-stock policy when other agents use a more
realistic model of human ordering behavior. Finally, applying transfer-learning reduces the training time by
one order of magnitude. Managerial implications: This paper shows how artificial intelligence can be applied
to inventory optimization. Our approach can be extended to other supply chain optimization problems,
especially those in which supply chain partners act in irrational or unpredictable ways.
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1. Introduction
The beer game consists of a serial supply chain network with four agents—a retailer, a warehouse, a
distributor, and a manufacturer—who must make independent replenishment decisions with limited
information. The game is widely used in classroom settings to demonstrate the bullwhip effect, a
phenomenon in which order variability increases as one moves upstream in the supply chain, as
well as the importance of communication and coordination in the supply chain. The bullwhip effect
occurs for a number of reasons, some rational (Lee et al. 1997) and some behavioral (Sterman
1989). It is an inadvertent outcome that emerges when the players try to achieve the stated purpose
of the game, which is to minimize costs. In this paper, we are interested not in the bullwhip effect
but in the stated purpose, i.e., the minimization of supply chain costs, which underlies the decision
making in every real-world supply chain. For general discussions of the bullwhip effect, see, e.g.,
Lee et al. (2004), Geary et al. (2006), and Snyder and Shen (2019).
The agents in the beer game are arranged sequentially and numbered from 1 (retailer) to 4
(manufacturer), respectively. (See Figure 1.) The retailer node faces a stochastic demand from its
customer, and the manufacturer node has an unlimited source of supply. There are deterministic
transportation lead times (ltr) imposed on the flow of product from upstream to downstream,
though the actual lead time is stochastic due to stockouts upstream; there are also deterministic
information lead times (lin) on the flow of information from downstream to upstream (replenish-
ment orders). Each agent may have nonzero shortage and holding costs.
In each period of the game, each agent chooses an order quantity q to submit to its predecessor
(supplier) in an attempt to minimize the long-run system-wide costs,
T∑
t=1
4∑
i=1
cih(IL
i
t)
+ + cip(IL
i
t)
−, (1)
where i is the index of the agents; t= 1, . . . , T is the index of the time periods; T is the time horizon
of the game (which is often unknown to the players); cih and c
i
p are the holding and shortage cost
coefficients, respectively, of agent i; and ILit is the inventory level of agent i in period t. If IL
i
t > 0,
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Figure 1 Generic view of the beer game network.
4 3 2 1
Manufacturer Distributer Warehouse Retailer
Supplier Customer
then the agent has inventory on-hand, and if ILit < 0, then it has backorders.The notation x
+ and
x− denotes max{0, x} and max{0,−x}, respectively.
The standard rules of the beer game dictate that the agents may not communicate in any way,
and that they do not share any local inventory statistics or cost information with other agents
until the end of the game, at which time all agents are made aware of the system-wide cost. In
other words, each agent makes decisions with only partial information about the environment
while also cooperates with other agents to minimize the total cost of the system. According to the
categorization by Claus and Boutilier (1998), the beer game is a decentralized, independent-learners
(ILs), multi-agent, cooperative problem.
The beer game assumes the agents incur holding and stockout costs but not fixed ordering
costs, and therefore the optimal inventory policy is a base-stock policy in which each stage orders
a sufficient quantity to bring its inventory position (on-hand plus on-order inventory minus back-
orders) equal to a fixed number, called its base-stock level (Clark and Scarf 1960). When there
are no stockout costs at the non-retailer stages, i.e., cip = 0, i∈ {2,3,4}, the well known algorithm
by Clark and Scarf (1960) provides the optimal base-stock levels. To the best of our knowledge,
there is no algorithm to find the optimal base-stock levels for general stockout-cost structures.More
significantly, when some agents do not follow a base-stock or other rational policy, the form and
parameters of the optimal policy that a given agent should follow are unknown.
In this paper, we propose an extension of deep Q-networks (DQN) to solve this problem. Our
algorithm is customized for the beer game, but we view it also as a proof-of-concept that DQN can
be used to solve messier, more complicated supply chain problems than those typically analyzed
in the literature. The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a brief summary of
the relevant literature and our contributions to it. The details of the algorithm are introduced in
Section 3. Section 4 provides numerical experiments, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
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2. Literature Review
2.1. Current State of Art
The beer game consists of a serial supply chain network. Under the conditions dictated by the
game (zero fixed ordering costs, no ordering capacities, linear holding and backorder costs, etc.),
a base-stock policy is optimal at each stage (Lee et al. 1997). If the demand process and costs are
stationary, then so are the optimal base-stock levels, which implies that in each period (except the
first), each stage simply orders from its supplier exactly the amount that was demanded from it. If
the customer demands are i.i.d. random and if backorder costs are incurred only at stage 1, then
the optimal base-stock levels can be found using the exact algorithm by Clark and Scarf (1960).
There is a substantial literature on the beer game and the bullwhip effect. We review some of
that literature here, considering both independent learners (ILs) and joint action learners (JALs)
(Claus and Boutilier 1998). (ILs have no information about the other agent’s current states, whereas
JALs may share such information.) For a more comprehensive review, see Devika et al. (2016). See
Martinez-Moyano et al. (2014) for a thorough history of the beer game.
In the category of ILs, Mosekilde and Larsen (1988) develop a simulation and test different
ordering policies, which are expressed using a formula that involves state variables such as the
number of anticipated shipments and unfilled orders. They assume the customer demand is 4 in
each of the first four periods, and then 7 per period for the remainder of the horizon. Sterman
(1989) uses a similar version of the game in which the demand is 8 after the first four periods.
(Hereinafter, we refer to this demand process as C(4,8) or the classic demand process.) Also, he
do not allow the players to be aware of the demand process. He proposes a formula (which we
call the Sterman formula) to determine the order quantity based on the current backlog of orders,
on-hand inventory, incoming and outgoing shipments, incoming orders, and expected demand. His
formula is based on the anchoring and adjustment method of Tversky and Kahneman (1979). In
a nutshell, the Sterman formula attempts to model the way human players over- or under-react
to situations they observe in the supply chain such as shortages or excess inventory. Note that
Sterman’s formula is not an attempt to optimize the order quantities in the beer game; rather, it
Author: Article Short Title
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is intended to model typical human behavior. There are multiple extensions of Sterman’s work.
For example, Strozzi et al. (2007) considers the beer game when the customer demand increases
constantly after four periods and proposes a genetic algorithm (GA) to obtain the coefficients of
the Sterman model. Subsequent behavioral beer game studies include Croson and Donohue (2003)
and Croson and Donohue (2006a).
Most of the optimization methods described in the first paragraph of this section assume that
every agent follows a base-stock policy. The hallmark of the beer game, however, is that players
do not tend to follow such a policy, or any policy. Often their behavior is quite irrational. There is
comparatively little literature on how a given agent should optimize its inventory decisions when the
other agents do not play rationally (Sterman 1989, Strozzi et al. 2007)—that is, how an individual
player can best play the beer game when her teammates may not be making optimal decisions.
Some of the beer game literature assumes the agents are JALs, i.e., information about inventory
positions is shared among all agents, a significant difference compared to classical IL models. For
example, Kimbrough et al. (2002) propose a GA that receives a current snapshot of each agent
and decides how much to order according to the d+ x rule. In the d+ x rule, agent i observes dit,
the received demand/order in period t, chooses xit, and then places an order of size a
i
t = d
i
t + x
i
t.
In other words, xit is the (positive or negative) amount by which the agent’s order quantity differs
from his observed demand. Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo (2002) consider a beer game with three
agents with stochastic shipment lead times and stochastic demand. They propose a RL algorithm
to make decisions, in which the state variable is defined as the three inventory positions, which
each are discretized into 10 intervals. The agents may use any actions in the integers on [0,30].
Chaharsooghi et al. (2008) consider the same game and solution approach except with four agents
and a fixed length of 35 periods for each game. In their proposed RL, the state variable is the four
inventory positions, which are each discretized into nine intervals. Moreover, their RL algorithm
uses the d+ x rule to determine the order quantity, with x restricted to be in {0,1,2,3}. Note
that these RL algorithms assume that real-time information is shared among agents, whereas ours
adheres to the typical beer-game assumption that each agent only has local information.
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Figure 2 A generic procedure for RL.
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2.2. Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto 1998) is an area of machine learning that has been suc-
cessfully applied to solve complex sequential decision problems. RL is concerned with the question
of how a software agent should choose an action to maximize a cumulative reward. RL is a popular
tool in telecommunications, robot control, and game playing, to name a few (see Li (2017)).
Consider an agent that interacts with an environment. In each time step t, the agent observes
the current state of the system, st ∈ S (where S is the set of possible states), chooses an action
at ∈A(st) (where A(st) is the set of possible actions when the system is in state st), and gets reward
rt ∈R; and then the system transitions randomly into state st+1 ∈ S. This procedure is known as
a Markov decision process (MDP) (see Figure 2), and RL algorithms can be applied to solve this
type of problem.
The matrix Pa(s, s
′), which is called the transition probability matrix, provides the probability of
transitioning to state s′ when taking action a in state s, i.e., Pa(s, s′) = Pr(st+1 = s′ | st = s, at = a).
Similarly, Ra(s, s
′) defines the corresponding reward matrix. In each period t, the decision maker
takes action at = pit(s) according to a given policy, denoted by pit. The goal of RL is to maximize
the expected discounted sum of the rewards rt, when the systems runs for an infinite horizon. In
other words, the aim is to determine a policy pi : S→A to maximize ∑∞t=0 γtE [Rat(st, st+1)], where
at = pit(st) and 0≤ γ < 1 is the discount factor. For given Pa(s, s′) and Ra(s, s′), the optimal policy
can be obtained through dynamic programming or linear programming (Sutton and Barto 1998).
Another approach for solving this problem is Q-learning, a type of RL algorithm that obtains
the Q-value for any s ∈ S and a= pi(s), i.e. Q(s, a) = E [rt + γrt+1 + γ2rt+2 + · · · | st = s, at = a;pi] .
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The Q-learning approach starts with an initial guess for Q(s, a) for all s and a and then proceeds
to update them based on the iterative formula
Q(st, at) = (1−αt)Q(st, at) +αt
(
rt+1 + γmax
a
Q(st+1, a)
)
,∀t= 1,2, . . . , (2)
where αt is the learning rate at time step t. In each observed state, the agent chooses an action
through an -greedy algorithm: with probability t in time t, the algorithm chooses an action
randomly, and with probability 1− t, it chooses the action with the highest cumulative action
value, i.e., at+1 = argmaxaQ(st+1, a). The random selection of actions, called exploration, allows
the algorithm to explore the solution space and gives an optimality guarantee to the algorithm if
t→ 0 when t→∞ (Sutton and Barto 1998). After finding optimal Q∗, one can recover the optimal
policy as pi∗(s) = arg maxaQ
∗(s, a).
Both of the algorithms discussed so far (dynamic programming and Q-learning) guarantee that
they will obtain the optimal policy. However, due to the curse of dimensionality, these approaches
are not able to solve MDPs with large state or action spaces in reasonable amounts of time. Many
problems of interest (including the beer game) have large state and/or action spaces. Moreover, in
some settings (again, including the beer game), the decision maker cannot observe the full state
variable. This case, which is known as a partially observed MDP (POMDP), makes the problem
much harder to solve than MDPs.
In order to solve large POMDPs and avoid the curse of dimensionality, it is common to approxi-
mate the Q-values in the Q-learning algorithm (Sutton and Barto 1998). Linear regression is often
used for this purpose (Melo and Ribeiro 2007); however, it is not powerful or accurate enough for
our application. Non-linear functions and neural network approximators are able to provide more
accurate approximations; on the other hand, they are known to provide unstable or even diverging
Q-values due to issues related to non-stationarity and correlations in the sequence of observations
(Mnih et al. 2013). The seminal work of Mnih et al. (2015) solved these issues by proposing target
networks and utilizing experience replay memory (Lin 1992). They proposed a deep Q-network
(DQN) algorithm, which uses a deep neural network to obtain an approximation of the Q-function
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and trains it through the iterations of the Q-learning algorithm while updating another target
network. This algorithm has been applied to many competitive games, which are reviewed by Li
(2017). Our algorithm for the beer game is based on this approach.
The beer game exhibits one characteristic that differentiates it from most settings in which DQN
is commonly applied, namely, that there are multiple agents that cooperate in a decentralized
manner to achieve a common goal. Such a problem is called a decentralized POMDP, or Dec-
POMDP. Due to the partial observability and the non-stationarity of the local observations of
agents, Dec-POMDPs are hard to solve and are categorized as NEXP-complete problems (Bernstein
et al. 2002).
The beer game exhibits all of the complicating characteristics described above—large state and
action spaces, partial state observations, and decentralized cooperation. In the next section, we
discuss the drawbacks of current approaches for solving the beer game, which our algorithm aims
to overcome.
2.3. Drawbacks of Current Algorithms
In Section 2.1, we reviewed different approaches to solve the beer game. Although the model of
Clark and Scarf (1960) can solve some types of serial systems, for more general serial systems
neither the form nor the parameters of the optimal policy are known. Moreover, even in systems
for which a base-stock policy is optimal, such a policy may no longer be optimal for a given agent
if the other agents do not follow it. The formula-based beer-game models by Mosekilde and Larsen
(1988), Sterman (1989), and Strozzi et al. (2007) attempt to model human decision-making; they
do not attempt to model or determine optimal decisions.
A handful of models have attempted to optimize the inventory actions in serial supply chains
with more general cost or demand structures than those used by Clark and Scarf (1960); these are
essentially beer-game settings. However, these papers all assume full observation or a centralized
decision maker, rather than the local observations and decentralized approach taken in the beer
game. For example, Kimbrough et al. (2002) use a genetic algorithm (GA), while Chaharsooghi
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et al. (2008), Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo (2002) and Jiang and Sheng (2009) use RL. However,
classical RL algorithms can handle only a small or reduced-size state space. Accordingly, these
applications of RL in the beer game or even simpler supply chain networks also assume (implicitly
or explicitly) that size of the state space is small. This is unrealistic in the beer game, since the state
variable representing a given agent’s inventory level can be any number in (−∞,+∞). Solving such
an RL problem would be nearly impossible, as the model would be extremely expensive to train.
Moreover, Chaharsooghi et al. (2008) and Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo (2002), which model
beer-game-like settings, assume sharing of information. Also, to handle the curse of dimensionality,
they propose mapping the state variable onto a small number of tiles, which leads to the loss of
valuable state information and therefore of accuracy. Thus, although these papers are related to
our work, their assumption of full observability differentiates their work from the classical beer
game and from our paper.
Another possible approach to tackle this problem might be classical supervised machine learning
algorithms. However, these algorithms also cannot be readily applied to the beer game, since there
is no historical data in the form of “correct” input/output pairs. Thus, we cannot use a stand-alone
support vector machine or deep neural network with a training data-set and train it to learn the
best action (like the approach used by Oroojlooyjadid et al. (2017a,b) to solve some simpler supply
chain problems). Based on our understanding of the literature, there is a large gap between solving
the beer game problem effectively and what the current algorithms can handle. In order to fill this
gap, we propose a variant of the DQN algorithm to choose the order quantities in the beer game.
2.4. Our Contribution
We propose a Q-learning algorithm for the beer game in which a DNN approximates the Q-function.
Indeed, the general structure of our algorithm is based on the DQN algorithm (Mnih et al. 2015),
although we modify it substantially, since DQN is designed for single-agent, competitive, zero-sum
games and the beer game is a multi-agent, decentralized, cooperative, non-zero-sum game. In other
words, DQN provides actions for one agent that interacts with an environment in a competitive
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setting, and the beer game is a cooperative game in the sense that all of the players aim to minimize
the total cost of the system in a random number of periods. Also, beer game agents are playing
independently and do not have any information from other agents until the game ends and the
total cost is revealed, whereas DQN usually assumes the agent fully observes the state of the
environment at any time step t of the game. For example, DQN has been successfully applied to
Atari games (Mnih et al. 2015), but in these games the agent is attempting to defeat an opponent
and observes full information about the state of the systems at each time step t.
One naive approach to extend the DQN algorithm to solve the beer game is to use multiple
DQNs, one for each agent. However, using DQN as the decision maker of each agent results in
a competitive game in which each DQN agent plays independently to minimize its own cost. For
example, consider a beer game in which players 2, 3, and 4 each have a stand-alone, well-trained
DQN and the retailer (stage 1) uses a base-stock policy to make decisions. If the holding costs
are positive for all players and the stockout cost is positive only for the retailer (as is common in
the beer game), then the DQN at agents 2, 3, and 4 will return an optimal order quantity of 0 in
every period, since on-hand inventory hurts the objective function for these players, but stockouts
do not. This is a byproduct of the independent DQN agents minimizing their own costs without
considering the total cost, which is obviously not an optimal solution for the system as a whole.
Instead, we propose a unified framework in which the agents still play independently from one
another, but in the training phase, we use a feedback scheme so that the DQN agent learns the
total cost for the whole network and can, over time, learn to minimize it. Thus, the agents in our
model play smartly in all periods of the game to get a near-optimal cumulative cost for any random
horizon length.
In principle, our framework can be applied to multiple DQN agents playing the beer game
simultaneously on a team. However, to date we have designed and tested our approach only for a
single DQN agent whose teammates are not DQNs, e.g., they are controlled by simple formulas or
by human players. Enhancing the algorithm so that multiple DQNs can play simultaneously and
cooperatively is a topic of ongoing research.
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Another advantage of our approach is that it does not require knowledge of the demand distri-
bution, unlike classical inventory management approaches (e.g., Clark and Scarf 1960). In practice,
one can approximate the demand distribution based on historical data, but doing so is prone to
error, and basing decisions on approximate distributions may result in loss of accuracy in the beer
game. In contrast, our algorithm chooses actions directly based on the training data and does not
need to know, or estimate, the probability distribution directly.
The proposed approach works very well when we tune and train the DQN for a given agent
and a given set of game parameters (e.g., costs, lead times, action spaces, etc.). Once any of these
parameters changes, or the agent changes, in principle we need to tune and train a new network.
Although this approach works, it is time consuming since we need to tune hyper-parameters for
each new set of game parameters. To avoid this, we propose using a transfer learning approach
(Pan and Yang 2010) in which we transfer the acquired knowledge of one agent under one set of
game parameters to another agent with another set of game parameters. In this way, we decrease
the required time to train a new agent by roughly one order of magnitude.
To summarize, our algorithm is a variant of the DQN algorithm for choosing actions in the beer
game. In order to attain near-optimal cooperative solutions, we develop a feedback scheme as a
communication framework. Finally, to simplify training agents with new settings, we use transfer
learning to efficiently make use of the learned knowledge of trained agents. In addition to playing
the beer game well, we believe our algorithm serves as a proof-of-concept that DQN and other
machine learning approaches can be used for real-time decision making in complex supply chain
settings. Finally, we note that we have integrated our algorithm into a new online beer game
developed by Opex Analytics (http://beergame.opexanalytics.com/); see Figure 3. The Opex
beer game allows human players to compete with, or play on a team with, our DQN agent.
3. The DQN Algorithm
In this section, we first present the details of our DQN algorithm to solve the beer game, and then
describe the transfer learning mechanism.
Author: Article Short Title
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Figure 3 Screenshot of Opex Analytics online beer game integrated with our DQN agent
3.1. DQN for the Beer Game
In our algorithm, a DQN agent runs a Q-learning algorithm with DNN as the Q-function approx-
imator to learn a semi-optimal policy with the aim of minimizing the total cost of the game. Each
agent has access to its local information and considers the other agents as parts of its environment.
That is, the DQN agent does not know any information about the other agents, including both
static parameters such as costs and lead times, as well as dynamic state variables such as inventory
levels. We propose a feedback scheme to teach the DQN agent to work toward minimizing the total
system-wide cost, rather than its own local cost. The details of the scheme, Q-learning, state and
action spaces, reward function, DNN approximator, and the DQN algorithm are discussed below.
State variables: Consider agent i in time step t. Let OOit denote the on-order items at agent i,
i.e., the items that have been ordered from agent i+1 but not received yet; let AOit denote the size
of the arriving order (i.e., the demand) received from agent i− 1; let ASit denote the size of the
arriving shipment from agent i+ 1; let ait denote the action agent i takes; and let IL
i
t denote the
inventory level as defined in Section 1. We interpret AO1t to represent the end-customer demand
and AS4t to represent the shipment received by agent 4 from the external supplier. In each period
t of the game, agent i observes ILit, OO
i
t, AO
i
t, and AS
i
t . In other words, in period t agent i has
historical observations oit = [((IL
i
1)
+, ILi1)
−,OOi1,AO
i
1,RS
i
1), . . . , ((IL
i
t)
+, ILit)
−, ,OOit,AO
i
t,AS
i
t)] .
In addition, any beer game will finish in a finite time horizon, so the problem can be modeled as
a POMDP in which each historic sequence oit is a distinct state and the size of the vector o
i
t grows
over time, which is difficult for any RL or DNN algorithm to handle. To address this issue, we
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capture only the last m periods (e.g., m = 3) and use them as the state variable; thus the state
variable of agent i in time t is sit =
[
((ILij)
+, ILij)
−,OOij,AO
i
j,RS
i
j)
]t
j=t−m+1 .
DNN architecture: In our algorithm, DNN plays the role of the Q-function approximator, pro-
viding the Q-value as output for any pair of state s and action a. There are various possible
approaches to build the DNN structure. The natural approach is to provide the state s and action
a as the input of the DNN and then get the corresponding Q(s, a) from the output. Thus, we
provide as input the m previous state variables into the DNN and get as output Q(s, a) for every
possible action a∈A (since in beer game A(s) is fixed for any s, we use A hereinafter).
Action space: In each period of the game, each agent can order any amount in [0,∞). Since our
DNN architecture provides the Q-value of all possible actions in the output, having an infinite
action space is not practical. Therefore, to limit the cardinality of the action space, we use the
d+ x rule for selecting the order quantity: The agent determines how much more or less to order
than its received order; that is, the order quantity is d+x, where x is in some bounded set. Thus,
the output of the DNN is x∈ [al, au] (al, au ∈Z), so that the action space is of size au− al + 1.
Experience replay: The DNN algorithm requires a mini-batch of input and a corresponding set
of output values to learn the Q-values. Since we use DQN algorithm as our RL engine, we have the
new state st+1, the current state st, the action at taken, and the observed reward rt, in each period
t. This information can provide the required set of input and output for the DNN; however, the
resulting sequence of observations from the RL results in a non-stationary data-set in which there is
a strong correlation among consecutive records. This makes the DNN and, as a result, the RL prone
to over-fitting the previously observed records and may even result in a diverging approximator
(Mnih et al. 2015). To avoid this problem, we follow the suggestion of Mnih et al. (2015) and use
experience replay (Lin 1992).In this way, agent i has experience memory Ei that in iteration t of the
algorithm, agent i’s observation eit = (s
i
t, a
i
t, r
i
t, s
i
t+1) is added in, so that E
i includes {ei1, ei2, . . . , eit}
in period t. Then, in order to avoid having correlated observations, we select a random mini-batch
of the agent’s experience replay to train the corresponding DNN (if applicable). This approach
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breaks the correlations among the training data and reduces the variance of the output (Mnih
et al. 2013). Moreover, as a byproduct of experience replay, we also get a tool to keep every piece of
the valuable information, which allows greater efficiency in a setting in which the state and action
spaces are huge and any observed experience is valuable.
Reward function: In iteration t of the game, agent i observes state variable sit and takes action
ait; we need to know the corresponding reward value r
i
t to measure the quality of action a
i
t. The
state variable, sit+1, allows us to calculate IL
i
t+1 and thus the corresponding shortage or holding
costs, and we consider the summation of these costs for rit. However, since there are information
and transportation lead times, there is a delay between taking action ait and observing its effect on
the reward. Moreover, the reward rit reflects not only the action taken in period t, but also those
taken in previous periods, and it is not possible to decompose rit to isolate the effects of each of
these actions. However, defining the state variable to include information from the last m periods
resolves this issue to some degree; the reward rit represents the reward of state s
i
t, which includes
the observations of the previous m steps.
On the other hand, the reward values rit are the intermediate rewards of each agent, and the
objective of the beer game is to minimize the total reward of the game,
∑4
i=1
∑T
t=1 r
i
t, which
the agents only learn after finishing the game. In order to add this information into the agents’
experience, we use reward shaping through a feedback scheme.
Feedback scheme: When any episode of the beer game is finished, all agents are made aware of
the total reward. In order to share this information among the agents, we propose a penalization
procedure in the training phase to provide feedback to the DQN agent about the way that it has
played. Let ω=
∑4
i=1
∑T
t=1
rit
T
and τ i =
∑T
t=1
rit
T
, i.e., the average reward per period and the average
reward of agent i per period, respectively. After the end of each episode of the game (i.e., after
period T ), for each DQN agent i we update its observed reward in all T time steps in the experience
replay memory using rit = r
i
t +
βi
3
(ω − τ i), ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, where βi is a regularization coefficient
for agent i. With this procedure, agent i gets appropriate feedback about its actions and learns to
take actions that result in minimum total cost, not locally optimal solutions.
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Determining the value of m: As noted above, the DNN maintains information from the most
recent m periods in order to keep the size of the state variable fixed and to address the issue with
the delayed observation of the reward. In order to select an appropriate value for m, one has to
consider the value of the lead times throughout the game. First, when agent i takes action ait at
time t, it does not observe its effect until at least ltri + l
in
i periods later, when the order may be
received. Moreover, node i+ 1 may not have enough stock to satisfy the order immediately, in
which case the shipment is delayed and in the worst case agent i will not observe the corresponding
reward rit until
∑4
j=i(l
tr
j + l
in
j ) periods later. However, one needs the reward r
i
t to evaluate the
action ait taken. Thus, ideally m should be chosen at least as large as
∑4
j=1(l
tr
j + l
in
j ). On the other
hand, this value can be large and selecting a large value for m results in a large input size for the
DNN, which increases the training time. Therefore, selecting m is a trade-off between accuracy
and computation time, and m should be selected according to the required level of accuracy and
the available computation power. In our numerical experiment,
∑4
j=1(l
tr
j + l
in
j ) = 15 or 16, and we
test m∈ {5,10}.
The algorithm: Our algorithm to get the policy pi to solve the beer game is provided in Algorithm
1. The algorithm, which is based on that of Mnih et al. (2015), finds weights θ of the DNN network
to minimize the Euclidean distance between Q(s, a;θ) and yj, where yj is the prediction of the
Q-value that is obtained from target network Q− with weights θ−. Every C iterations, the weights
θ− are updated by θ. Moreover, the actions in each training step of the algorithm are obtained by
an -greedy algorithm, which is explained in Section 2.2.
In the algorithm, in period t agent i takes action ait, satisfies the arriving demand/order AO
i
t−1,
observes the new demand AOit, and then receives the shipments AS
i
t . This sequence of events,
which is explained in detail in online supplement E, results in the new state st+1. Feeding st+1 into
the DNN network with weights θ provides the corresponding Q-value for state st+1 and all possible
actions. The action with the smallest Q-value is our choice. Finally, at the end of each episode, the
feedback scheme runs and distributes the total cost among all agents.
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Algorithm 1 DQN for Beer Game
1: procedure DQN
2: Initialize Experience Replay Memory Ei = [ ] , ∀i
3: for Episode= 1 : n do
4: Reset IL, OO, d, AO, and AS for each agent
5: for t= 1 : T do
6: for i= 1 : 4 do
7: With probability  take random action at,
8: otherwise set at = argmin
a
Q (st, a;θ)
9: Execute action at, observe reward rt and state st+1
10: Add (sit, a
i
t, r
i
t, s
i
t+1) into the Ei
11: Get a mini-batch of experiences (sj, aj, rj, sj+1) from Ei
12: Set yj =
{
rj if it is the terminal state
rj + min
a
Q(sj, a;θ
−) otherwise
13: Run forward and backward step on the DNN with loss function (yj −Q (sj, aj;θ))2
14: Every C iterations, set θ− = θ
15: end for
16: end for
17: Run feedback scheme, update experience replay of each agent
18: end for
19: end procedure
Evaluation procedure: In order to validate our algorithm, we compare the results of our algo-
rithm to those obtained using the optimal base-stock levels (when possible) in serial systems by
Clark and Scarf (1960), as well as models of human beer-game behavior by Sterman (1989). (Note
that none of these methods attempts to do exactly the same thing as our method. The methods
by Clark and Scarf (1960) optimizes the base-stock levels assuming all players follow a base-stock
policy—which beer game players do not tend to do—and the formula by Sterman (1989) models
human beer-game play, but they do not attempt to optimize.) The details of the training procedure
and benchmarks are described in Section 4.
3.2. Transfer Learning
Transfer learning (Pan and Yang 2010) has been an active and successful field of research in machine
learning and especially in image processing. In transfer learning, there is a source dataset S and a
trained neural network to perform a given task, e.g. classification, regression, or decisioning through
RL. Training such networks may take a few days or even weeks. So, for similar or even slightly
different target datasets T, one can avoid training a new network from scratch and instead use the
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same trained network with a few customizations. The idea is that most of the learned knowledge
on dataset S can be used in the target dataset with a small amount of additional training. This
idea works well in image processing (e.g. Rajpurkar et al. (2017)) and considerably reduces the
training time.
In order to use transfer learning in the beer game, assume there exists a source agent i∈ {1,2,3,4}
with trained network Si (with a fixed size on all agents), parameters P
i
1 = {|Aj1|, cjp1 , cjh1}, observed
demand distribution D1, and co-player policy pi1. The weight matrix Wi contains the learned
weights such that W qi denotes the weight between layers q and q+ 1 of the neural network, where
q ∈ {0, . . . , nh}, and nh is the number of hidden layers. The aim is to train a neural network Sj for
target agent j ∈ {1,2,3,4}, j 6= i. We set the structure of the network Sj the same as that of Si,
and initialize Wj with Wi, making the first k layers not trainable. Then, we train neural network
Sj with a small learning rate. Note that, as we get closer to the final layer, which provides the
Q-values, the weights become less similar to agent i’s and more specific to each agent. Thus, the
acquired knowledge in the first k hidden layer(s) of the neural network belonging to agent i is
transferred to agent j, in which k is a tunable parameter. Following this procedure, in Section 4.3,
we test the use of transfer learning in six cases to transfer the learned knowledge of source agent i
to:
1. Target agent j 6= i in the same game.
2. Target agent j with {|Aj1|, cjp2 , cjh2}, i.e., the same action space but different cost coefficients.
3. Target agent j with {|Aj2|, cjp1 , cjh1}, i.e., the same cost coefficients but different action space.
4. Target agent j with {|Aj2|, cjp2 , cjh2}, i.e., different action space and cost coefficients.
5. Target agent j with {|Aj2|, cjp2 , cjh2}, i.e., different action space and cost coefficients, as well as
a different demand distribution D2.
6. Target agent j with {|Aj2|, cjp2 , cjh2}, i.e., different action space and cost coefficients, as well as
a different demand distribution D2 and co-player policy pi2.
Unless stated otherwise, the demand distribution and co-player policy are the same for the source
and target agents. Transfer learning could also be used when other aspects of the problem change,
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e.g., lead times, state representation, and so on. This avoids having to tune the parameters of the
neural network for each new problem, which considerably reduces the training time. However, we
still need to decide how many layers should be trainable, as well as to determine which agent can
be a base agent for transferring the learned knowledge. Still, this is computationally much cheaper
than finding each network and its hyper-parameters from scratch.
4. Numerical Experiments
In Section 4.1, we discuss a set of numerical experiments that uses a simple demand distribution
and a relatively small action space:
• dt0 ∈U[0,2], A= {−2,−1,0,1,2}.
After exploring the behavior of our algorithm under different co-player policies, in Section 4.2 we
test the algorithm using three well-known cases from the literature, which have larger possible
demand values and action spaces:
• dt0 ∈U[0,8], A= {−8, . . . ,8} (Croson and Donohue 2006b)
• dt0 ∈ N(10,22), A = {−5, . . . ,5} (adapted from Chen and Samroengraja 2000, , who assume
N(50,202))
• dt0 ∈C(4,8), A= {−8, . . . ,8} (Sterman 1989).
As noted above, we only consider cases in which a single DQN plays with non-DQN agents, e.g.,
simulated human co-players. In each of the cases listed above, we consider three types of policies
that the non-DQN co-players follow: (i) base-stock policy, (ii) Sterman formula, (iii) random policy.
In the random policy, agent i also follows a d+ x rule, in which ati ∈ A is selected randomly and
with equal probability, for each t. After analyzing these cases, in Section 4.3 we provide the results
obtained using transfer learning for each of the six proposed cases.
We test values of m in {5,10} and C ∈ {5000,10000}. Our DNN network is a fully connected
network, in which each node has a ReLU activation function. The input is of size 5m, and there
are three hidden layers in the neural network. There is one output node for each possible value of
the action, and each of these nodes takes a value in R indicating the Q-value for that action. Thus,
there are au−al + 1 output nodes, and the neural network has shape [5m,180,130,61, au−al + 1].
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In order to optimize the network, we used the Adam optimizer (Kingma and Ba 2014) with a
batch size of 64. Although the Adam optimizer has its own weight decaying procedure, we used
exponential decay with a stair of 10000 iterations with rate 0.98 to decay the learning rate further.
This helps to stabilize the training trajectory. We trained each agent on at most 60000 episodes
and used a replay memory E equal to the one million most recently observed experiences. Also,
the training of the DNN starts after observing at least 500 episodes of the game. The -greedy
algorithm starts with = 0.9 and linearly reduces it to 0.1 in the first 80% of iterations.
In the feedback mechanism, the appropriate value of the feedback coefficient βi heavily depends
on τj, the average reward for agent j, for each j 6= i. For example, when τi is one order of magnitude
larger than τj, for all j 6= i, agent i needs a large coefficient to get more feedback from the other
agents. Indeed, the feedback coefficient has a similar role as the regularization parameter λ has in
the lasso loss function; the value of that parameter depends on the `-norm of the variables, but
there is no universal rule to determine the best value for λ. Similarly, proposing a simple rule or
value for each βi is not possible, as it depends on τi, ∀i. For example, we found that a very large
βi does not work well, since the agent tries to decrease other agents’ costs rather than its own.
Similarly, with a very small βi, the agent learns how to minimize its own cost instead of the total
cost. Therefore, we used a similar cross validation approach to find good values for each βi.
4.1. Basic Cases
In this section, we test our approach using a beer game setup with the following characteristics.
Information and shipment lead times, ltrj and l
in
j , equal 2 periods at every agent. Holding and
stockout costs are given by ch = [2,2,2,2] and cp = [2,0,0,0], respectively, where the vectors specify
the values for agents 1, . . . ,4. The demand is an integer uniformly drawn from {0,1,2}. Additionally,
we assume that agent i observes the arriving shipment ASit when it chooses its action for period
t. We relax this assumption later. We use al =−2 and au = 2; so that there are 5 outputs in the
neural network. i.e., each agent chooses an order quantity that is at most 2 units greater or less
than the observed demand. (Later, we expand these to larger action spaces.)
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We consider two types of simulated human players. In Section 4.1.1, we discuss results for the
case in which one DQN agent plays on a team in which the other three players use a base-stock
policy to choose their actions, i.e., the non-DQN agents behave rationally. See https://youtu.
be/gQa6iWGcGWY for a video animation of the policy that the DQN learns in this case. Then, in
Section 4.1.2, we assume that the other three agents use the Sterman formula (i.e., the formula by
Sterman (1989)), which models irrational play.
For the cost coefficients and other settings specified for this beer game, it is optimal for all players
to follow a base-stock policy, and we use this policy as a benchmark and a lower bound on the
base stock cost. The vector of optimal base-stock levels is [8,8,0,0], and the resulting average cost
per period is 2.0705, though these levels may be slightly suboptimal due to rounding. This cost is
allocated to stages 1–4 as [2.0073,0.0632,0.03,0.00],. In the experiments in which one of the four
agents is played by DQN, the other three agents continue to use their optimal base-stock levels.
4.1.1. DQN Plus Base-Stock Policy We consider four cases, with the DQN playing the
role of each of the four players and the co-players using a base-stock policy. We then compare the
results of our algorithm with the results of the case in which all players follow a base-stock policy,
which we call BS hereinafter.
The results of all four cases are shown in Figure 4. Each plot shows the training curve, i.e., the
evolution of the average cost per game as the training progresses. In particular, the horizontal axis
indicates the number of training episodes, while the vertical axis indicates the total cost per game.
After every 100 episodes of the game and the corresponding training, the cost of 50 validation
points (i.e., 50 new games) each with 100 periods, are obtained and their average plus a 95%
confidence interval are plotted. (The confidence intervals, which are light blue in the figure, are
quite narrow, so they are difficult to see.) The red line indicates the cost of the case in which all
players follow a base-stock policy. In each of the sub-figures, there are two plots; the upper plot
shows the cost, while the lower plot shows the normalized cost, in which each cost is divided by
the corresponding BS cost; essentially this is a “zoomed-in” version of the upper plot. We trained
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Figure 4 Total cost (upper figure) and normalized cost (lower figure) with one DQN agent and three agents
that follow base-stock policy
(a) DQN plays retailer (b) DQN plays warehouse
(c) DQN plays distributor
(d) DQN plays manufacturer
the network using values of β ∈ {5,10,20,50,100,200}, each for at most 60000 episodes. Figure 4
plots the results from the best βi value for each agent; we present the full results using different
βi,m and C values in Section C of the online supplement.
The figure indicates that DQN performs well in all cases and finds policies whose costs are close
to those of the BS policy. After the network is fully trained (i.e., after 60000 training episodes), the
average gap between the DQN cost and the BS cost, over all four agents, is 2.31%.
Figure 5 shows the trajectories of the retailer’s inventory level (IL), on-order quantity (OO),
order quantity (a), reward (r), and order up to level (OUTL) for a single game, when the retailer
is played by the DQN with β1 = 50, as well as when it is played by a base-stock policy (BS), and
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Figure 5 ILt, OOt, at, rt, and OUTL when DQN plays retailer and other agents follow base-stock policy
the Sterman formula (Strm). The base-stock policy and DQN have similar IL and OO trends, and
as a result their rewards are also very close: BS has a cost of [1.42,0.00,0.02,0.05] (total 1.49) and
DQN has [1.43,0.01,0.02,0.08] (total 1.54, or 3.4% larger). (Note that BS has a slightly different
cost here than reported on page 20 because those costs are the average costs of 50 samples while
this cost is from a single sample.) Similar trends are observed when the DQN plays the other three
roles; see Section B of the online supplement. This suggests that the DQN can successfully learn
to achieve costs close to BS when the other agents also play BS. (The OUTL plot shows that the
DQN does not quite follow a base-stock policy, even though its costs are similar.)
4.1.2. DQN Plus Sterman Formula Figure 6 shows the results of the case in which the
three non-DQN agents use the formula proposed by Sterman (1989) instead of a base-stock policy.
(See Section A of online supplement for the formula and its parameters.) For comparison, the red
line represents the case in which the single agent is played using a base-stock policy and the other
three agents continue to use the Sterman formula, a case we call Strm-BS.
From the figure, it is evident that the DQN plays much better than Strm-BS. This is because if
the other three agents do not follow a base-stock policy, it is no longer optimal for the fourth agent
to follow a base-stock policy, or to use the same base-stock level. In general, the optimal inventory
policy when other agents do not follow a base-stock policy is an open question. This figure suggests
that our DQN is able to learn to play effectively in this setting.
Table 1 gives the cost of all four agents when a given agent plays using either DQN or a base-
stock policy and the other agents play using the Sterman formula. From the table, we can see that
DQN learns how to play to decrease the costs of the other agents, and not just its own costs—for
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Table 1 Average cost under different choices of which agent uses DQN or Strm-BS.
Cost (DQN, Strm-BS)
DQN Agent Retailer Warehouse Distributer Manufacturer Total
Retailer (0.89, 1.89) (10.87, 10.83) (10.96, 10.98) (12.42, 12.82) (35.14, 36.52)
Warehouse (1.74, 9.99) (0.00, 0.13) (11.12, 10.80) (12.86, 12.34) (25.72, 33.27)
Distributer (5.60, 10.72) (0.11, 9.84) (0.00, 0.14) (12.53, 12.35) (18.25, 33.04)
Manufacturer (4.68, 10.72) (1.72, 10.60) (0.24, 10.13) (0.00, 0.07) (6.64, 31.52)
example, the retailer’s and warehouse’s costs are significantly lower when the distributor uses DQN
than they are when the distributor uses a base-stock policy. Similar conclusions can be drawn from
Figure 6. This shows the power of DQN when it plays with co-player agents that do not play
rationally, i.e., do not follow a base-stock policy, which is common in real-world supply chains.
Also, we note that when all agents follow the Sterman formula, the average cost of the agents is
[10.81, 10.76, 10.96, 12.6], for a total of 45.13, much higher than when any one agent uses DQN.
Finally, for details on IL,OO,a, r, and OUTL on this case see Section B of the online supplement.
4.2. Literature Benchmarks
We next test our approach on beer game settings from the literature. These have larger demand-
distribution domains, and therefore larger plausible action spaces, and thus represent harder
instances to train the DQN for. In all instances in this section, lin = [2,2,2,2] and ltr = [2,2,2,1].
Shortage and holding cost coefficients and the base-stock levels for each instance are presented in
Table 2.
Note that the Clark–Scarf algorithm assumes that stage 1 is the only stage with non-zero stockout
costs, whereas the U[0,8] instance has non-zero costs at every stage. Therefore, we used a heuristic
approach based on a two-moment approximation, similar to that proposed by Graves (1985), to
choose the base-stock levels; see Snyder (2018). In addition, the C(4,8) demand process is non-
stationary—4, then 8—but we allow only stationary base-stock levels. Therefore, we chose to set
the base-stock levels equal to the values that would be optimal if the demand were 8 in every period.
Finally, in the experiments in this section, we assume that agent i observes ASit after choosing a
i
t,
whereas in Section 4.1 we assumed the opposite. Therefore, the agents in these experiments have
one fewer piece of information when choosing actions, and are therefore more difficult to train.
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Figure 6 Total cost (upper figure) and normalized cost (lower figure) with one DQN agent and three agents
that follow the Sterman formula
(a) DQN plays retailer (b) DQN plays warehouse
(c) DQN plays distributor (d) DQN plays manufacturer
Table 2 Cost parameters and base-stock levels for instances with uniform, normal, and classic demand
distributions.
demand cp ch BS level
U[0,8] [1.0,1.0,1.0,1.0] [0.50,0.50,0.50,0.50] [19,20,20,14]
N(10,22) [10.0,0.0,0.0,0.0] [1.00,0.75,0.50,0.25] [48,43,41,30]
C(4,8) [1.0,1.0,1.0,1.0] [0.50,0.50,0.50,0.50] [32,32,32,24]
Tables 3, 4, and 5 show the results of the cases in which the DQN agent plays with co-players
who follow base-stock, Sterman, and random policies, respectively. In each group of columns, the
first column (“DQN”) gives the average cost (over 50 instances) when one agent (indicated by the
first column in the table) is played by the DQN and co-players are played by base-stock (Table 3),
Sterman (Table 4), or random (Table 5) agents. The second column in each group (“BS”, “Strm-BS”,
“Rand-BS”) gives the corresponding cost when the DQN agent is replaced by a base-stock agent
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Table 3 Results of DQN playing with co-players who follow base-stock policy.
Uniform Normal Classic
DQN BS Gap (%) DQN BS Gap (%) DQN BS Gap (%)
R 904.88 799.20 13.22 881.66 838.14 5.19 0.50 0.34 45.86
W 960.44 799.20 20.18 932.65 838.14 11.28 0.47 0.34 36.92
D 903.49 799.20 13.05 880.40 838.14 5.04 0.67 0.34 96.36
M 830.16 799.20 3.87 852.33 838.14 1.69 0.30 0.34 -13.13
Average 12.58 5.80 41.50
(using the base-stock levels given in Table 2) and the co-players remain as in the previous column.
The third column (“Gap”) gives the percentage difference between these two costs.
As Table 3 shows, when the DQN plays with base-stock co-players under uniform or normal
demand distributions, it obtains costs that are reasonably close to the case when all players use a
base-stock policy, with average gaps of 12.58% and 5.80%, respectively. These gaps are not quite
as small as those in Section 4.1, due to the larger action spaces in the instances in this section.
Since a base-stock policy is optimal at every stage, the small gaps demonstrate that the DQN can
learn to play the game well for these demand distributions. For the classic demand process, the
percentage gaps are larger. To see why, note that if the demand were to equal 8 in every period,
the base-stock levels for the classic demand process will result in ending inventory levels of 0 at
every stage. The four initial periods of demand equal to 4 disrupt this effect slightly, but the cost
of the optimal base-stock policy for the classic demand process is asymptotically 0 as the time
horizon goes to infinity. The absolute gap attained by the DQN is quite small—an average of 0.49
vs. 0.34 for the base-stock cost—but the percentage difference is large simply because the optimal
cost is close to 0. Indeed, if we allow the game to run longer, the cost of both algorithms decreases,
and so does the absolute gap. For example, when the DQN plays the retailer, after 500 periods the
discounted costs are 0.0090 and 0.0062 for DQN and BS, respectively, and after 1000 periods, the
costs are 0.0001 and 0.0000 (to four-digit precision).
Similar to the results of Section 4.1.2, when the DQN plays with co-players who follow the
Sterman formula, it performs far better than Strm-BS. As Table 4 shows, DQN performs 34%
better than Strm-BS on average. Finally, when DQN plays with co-players who use the random
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Table 4 Results of DQN playing with co-players who follow Sterman policy.
Uniform Normal Classic
DQN Strm-BS Gap (%) DQN Strm-BS Gap (%) DQN Strm-BS Gap (%)
R 6.88 8.99 -23.45 9.98 10.67 -6.44 3.80 13.28 -71.41
W 5.90 9.53 -38.10 7.11 10.03 -29.06 2.85 8.17 -65.08
D 8.35 10.99 -23.98 8.49 13.83 -38.65 3.82 20.07 -80.96
M 12.36 13.90 -11.07 13.86 15.37 -9.82 15.80 19.96 -20.82
Average -24.15 -20.99 -59.57
Table 5 Results of DQN playing with co-players who follow random policy.
Uniform Normal Classic
DQN Rand-BS Gap (%) DQN Rand-BS Gap (%) DQN Rand-BS Gap (%)
R 31.39 28.24 11.12 13.03 28.39 -54.10 19.99 25.88 -22.77
W 29.62 28.62 3.49 27.87 35.80 -22.15 23.05 23.44 -1.65
D 30.72 28.64 7.25 34.85 38.79 -10.15 22.81 23.53 -3.04
M 29.03 28.13 3.18 37.68 40.53 -7.02 22.36 22.45 -0.42
Average 6.26 -23.36 -6.97
policy, for all demand distributions DQN learns very well to play so as to minimize the total cost
of the system, and on average obtains 8% better solutions than Rand-BS.
To summarize, DQN does well regardless of the way the other agents play, and regardless of
the demand distribution. The DQN agent learns to attain near-BS costs when its co-players follow
a BS policy, and when playing with irrational co-players, it achieves a much smaller cost than a
base-stock policy would. Thus, when the other agents play irrationally, DQN should be used.
4.3. Faster Training through Transfer Learning
We trained a DQN network with shape [50,180,130,61,5], m= 10, β = 20, and C = 10000 for each
agent, with the same holding and stockout costs and action spaces as in section 4.1, using 60000
training episodes, and used these as the base networks for our transfer learning experiment. (In
transfer learning, all agents should have the same network structure to share the learned network
among different agents.) The remaining agents use a BS policy.
Table 6 shows a summary of the results of the six cases discussed in Section 3.2. The first set of
columns indicates the holding and shortage cost coefficients, the size of the action space, as well as
the demand distribution and the co-players’ policy for the base agent (first row) and the target agent
(remaining rows). The “Gap” column indicates the average gap between the cost of the resulting
DQN and the cost of a BS policy; in the first row, it is analogous to the 2.31% average gap reported
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Table 6 Results of transfer learning when pi1 is BS and D1 is U[0,2]
(Holding, Shortage) Cost Coefficients |A| D2 pi2 Gap CPU TimeR W D M (%) (sec)
Base agent (2,2) (2,0) (2,0) (2,0) 5 U[0,2] BS 2.31 28,390,987
Case 1 (2,2) (2,0) (2,0) (2,0) 5 U[0,2] BS 6.06 1,593,455
Case 2 (5,1) (5,0) (5,0) (5,0) 5 U[0,2] BS 6.16 1,757,103
Case 3 (2,2) (2,0) (2,0) (2,0) 11 U[0,2] BS 10.66 1,663,857
Case 4 (10,1) (10,0) (10,0) (10,0) 11 U[0,2] BS 12.58 1,593,455
Case 5 (1,10) (0.75,0) (0.5,0) (0.25,0) 11 N(10,22) BS 17.41 1,234,461
Case 6 (1,10) (0.75,0) (0.5,0) (0.25,0) 11 N(10,22) Strm -38.20 1,153,571
Case 6 (1,10) (0.75,0) (0.5,0) (0.25,0) 11 N(10,22) Rand -0.25 1,292,295
in Section 4.1.1. The average gap is relatively small in all cases, which shows the effectiveness of
the transfer learning approach. Moreover, this approach is efficient, as demonstrated in the last
column, which reports the average CPU times for all agent. In order to get the base agents, we did
hyper-parameter tuning and trained 140 instances to get the best possible set of hyper-parameters,
which resulted in a total of 28,390,987 seconds of training. However, using the transfer learning
approach, we do not need any hyper-parameter tuning; we only need to check which source agent
and which k provides the best results. This requires only 12 instances to train and resulted in an
average training time (across case 1-4) of 1,613,711 seconds—17.6 times faster than training the
base agent. Additionally, in case 5, in which a normal distribution is used, full hyper-parameter
tuning took 20,396,459 seconds, with an average gap of 4.76%, which means transfer learning was
16.6 times faster on average. We did not run the full hyper-parameter tuning for the instances of
case-6, but it is similar to that of case-5 and should take similar training time, and as a result a
similar improvement from transfer learning. Thus, once we have a trained agent i with a given set
P i1 of parameters, demand D1 and co-players’ policy pi1, we can efficiently train a new agent j with
parameters P j2 , demand D2 and co-players’ policy pi2.
In order to get more insights about the transfer learning process, Figure 7 shows the results
of case 4, which is a quite complex transfer learning case that we test for the beer game. The
target agents have holding and shortage costs (10,1), (10,0), (10,0), and (10,0) for agents 1 to 4,
respectively; and each agent can select any action in {−5, . . . ,5}. Each caption reports the base
agent (shown by b) and the value of k used. Compared to the original procedure (see Figure 4),
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Figure 7 Results of transfer learning for case 4 (different agent, cost coefficients, and action space)
(a) Target agent = retailer (b= 3, k= 1) (b) Target agent = wholesaler (b= 1, k= 1)
(c) Target agent = distributor (b= 3, k= 2) (d) Target agent = manufacturer (b= 4, k= 2)
i.e., k= 0, the training is less noisy and after a few thousand non-fluctuating training episodes, it
converges into the final solution. The resulting agents obtain costs that are close to those of BS,
with a 12.58% average gap compared to the BS cost. (The details of the other cases are provided
in Sections D.1—D.5 of the online supplement.)
Finally, Table 7 explores the effect of k on the tradeoff between training speed and solution
accuracy. As k increases, the number of trainable variables decreases and, not surprisingly, the CPU
times are smaller but the costs are larger. For example, when k = 3, the training time is 46.89%
smaller than the training time when k= 0, but the solution cost is 17.66% and 0.34% greater than
the BS policy, compared to 4.22% and -11.65% for k= 2.
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Table 7 Savings in computation time due to transfer learning. First row provides average training time among
all instances. Third row provides average of the best obtained gap in cases for which an optimal solution exists.
Fourth row provides average gap among all transfer learning instances, i.e., cases 1–6.
k= 0 k= 1 k= 2 k= 3
Training time 185,679 126,524 118,308 107,711
Decrease in time compared to k= 0 — 37.61% 41.66% 46.89%
Average gap in cases 1–4 2.31% 4.39% 4.22% 17.66%
Average gap in cases 1–6 — -15.95% -11.65% 0.34%
To summarize, transferring the acquired knowledge between the agents is very efficient. The
target agents achieve costs that are close to those of the BS policy (when co-players follow BS) and
they achieve smaller costs than Strm-BS and Rand-BS, regardless of the dissimilarities between
the source and the target agents. The training of the target agents start from relatively small cost
values, the training trajectories are stable and fairly non-noisy, and they quickly converge to a
cost value close to that of the BS policy or smaller than Strm-BS and Rand-BS. Even when the
action space and costs for the source and target agents are different, transfer learning is still quite
effective, resulting in a 12.58% gap compared to the BS policy. This is an important result, since it
means that if the settings change—either within the beer game or in real supply chain settings—we
can train new DQN agents much more quickly than we could if we had to begin each training from
scratch.
5. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we consider the beer game, a decentralized, multi-agent, cooperative supply chain
problem. A base-stock inventory policy is known to be optimal for special cases, but once some of
the agents do not follow a base-stock policy (as is common in real-world supply chains), the optimal
policy of the remaining players is unknown. To address this issue, we propose an algorithm based
on deep Q-networks. It obtains near-optimal solutions when playing alongside agents who follow a
base-stock policy and performs much better than a base-stock policy when the other agents use a
more realistic model of ordering behavior. Furthermore, the algorithm does not require knowledge
of the demand probability distribution and uses only historical data.
To reduce the computation time required to train new agents with different cost coefficients or
action spaces, we propose a transfer learning method. Training new agents with this approach takes
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less time since it avoids the need to tune hyper-parameters and has a smaller number of trainable
variables. Moreover, it is quite powerful, resulting in beer game costs that are close to those of
fully-trained agents while reducing the training time by an order of magnitude.
A natural extension of this paper is to apply our algorithm to supply chain networks with other
topologies, e.g., distribution networks. Another important extension is having multiple learnable
agents. Finally, developing algorithms capable of handling continuous action spaces will improve
the accuracy of our algorithm.
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Appendix A: Sterman Formula Parameters
The computational experiments that use Strm agents calculate the order quantity using formula (3), adapted
from Sterman (1989).
qit = max{0,AOi−1t+1 +αi(ILit− ai) +βi(OOit− bi)} (3)
where αi, ai, βi, and bi are the parameters corresponding to the inventory level and on-order quantity. The
idea is that the agent sets the order quantity equal to the demand forecast plus two terms that represent
adjustments that the agent makes based on the deviations between its current inventory level (resp., on-order
quantity) and a target value ai (resp., bi). We set ai = µd, where µd is the average demand; b
i = µd(l
fi
i + l
tr
i );
αi =−0.5; and βi =−0.2 for all agents i= 1,2,3,4. The negative α and β mean that the player over-orders
when the inventory level or on-order quantity fall below the target value ai or bi.
Appendix B: Extended Numerical Results
This appendix shows additional results on the details of play of each agent. Figure 8 provides the details of
IL, OO, a, r, and OUTL for each agent when the DQN retailer plays with co-players who use the BS policy.
Clearly, DQN attains a similar IL, OO, action, and reward to those of BS. Figure 9 provides analogous results
for the case in which the DQN manufacturer plays with three Strm agents. The DQN agent learns that the
shortage costs of the non-retailer agents are zero and exploits that fact to reduce the total cost. In each of
the figures, the top set of charts provides the results of the retailer, followed by the warehouse, distributor,
and manufacturer.
Appendix C: The Effect of β on the Performance of Each Agent
Figure 10 plots the training trajectories for DQN agents playing with three BS agents using various values
of C, m, and β. In each sub-figure, the blue line denotes the result when all players use a BS policy while
the remaining curves each represent the agent using DQN with different values of C, β, and m, trained for
60000 episodes with a learning rate of 0.00025.
As shown in Figure 10a, when the DQN plays the retailer, β1 ∈ {20,40} works well, and β1 = 40 provides
the best results. As we move upstream in the supply chain (warehouse, then distributor, then manufacturer),
Author: Article Short Title
34 —– 00(0), pp. 000–000, c© 0000 INFORMS
Figure 8 ILt, OOt, at, and rt of all agents when DQN retailer plays with three BS co-players
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Figure 9 ILt, OOt, at, and rt of all agents when DQN manufacturer plays with three Strm-BS co-players
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smaller β values become more effective (see Figures 10b–10d). Recall that the retailer bears the largest
share of the optimal expected cost per period, and as a result it needs a larger β than the other agents.
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Figure 10 Total cost (upper figure) and normalized cost (lower figure) with one DQN agent and three agents
that follow base-stock policy
(a) DQN plays retailer (b) DQN plays warehouse
(c) DQN plays distributor (d) DQN plays manufacturer
Not surprisingly, larger m values provide attain better costs since the DQN has more knowledge of the
environment. Finally, larger C works better and provides a stable DQN model. However, there are some
combinations for which smaller C and m also work well, e.g., see Figure 10d, trajectory 5000-20-5.
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Figure 11 Results of transfer learning between agents with the same cost coefficients and action space
(a) Case 1-4-1 (b) Case 2-4-1 (c) Case 3-1-1 (d) Case 4-2-1
Appendix D: Extended Results on Transfer Learning
D.1. Transfer Knowledge Between Agents
In this section, we present the results of the transfer learning method when the trained agent i∈ {1,2,3,4}
transfers its first k ∈ {1,2,3} layer(s) into co-player agent j ∈ {1,2,3,4}, j 6= i. For each target-agent j, Figure
11 shows the results for the best source-agent i and the number of shared layers k, out of the 9 possible
choices for i and k. In the sub-figure captions, the notation j-i-k indicates that source-agent i shares weights
of the first k layers with target-agent j, so that those k layers remain non-trainable.
Except for agent 2, all agents obtain costs that are very close to those of the BS policy, with a 6.06% gap,
on average. (In Section 4.1.1, the average gap is 2.31%.) However, none of the agents was a good source
for agent 2. It seems that the acquired knowledge of other agents is not enough to get a good solution for
this agent, or the feature space that agent 2 explores is different from other agents, so that it cannot get a
solution whose cost is close to the BS cost.
In order to get more insight, consider Figure 4, which presents the best results obtained through hyper-
parameter tuning for each agent. In that figure, all agents start the training with a large cost value, and
after 25000 fluctuating iterations, each converges to a stable solution. In contrast, in Figure 11, each agent
starts from a relatively small cost value, and after a few thousand training episodes converges to the final
solution. Moreover, for agent 3, the final cost of the transfer learning solution is smaller than that obtained
by training the network from scratch. And, the transfer learning method used one order of magnitude less
CPU time than the approach in Section 4.1.1 to obtain very close results.
We also observe that agent j can obtain good results when k= 1 and i is either j− 1 or j+ 1. This shows
that the learned weights of the first DQN network layer are general enough to transfer knowledge to the
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Figure 12 Fesults of transfer learning between agents with different cost coefficients and same action space
(a) Case 1-4-1 (b) Case 2-3-3 (c) Case 3-1-1 (d) Case 4-4-2
other agents, and also that the learned knowledge of neighboring agents is similar. Also, for any agent j,
agent i= 1 provides similar results to that of agent i= j− 1 or i= j+ 1 does, and in some cases it provides
slightly smaller costs, which shows that agent 1 captures general feature values better than the others.
D.2. Transfer Knowledge for Different Cost Coefficients
Figure 12 shows the best results achieved for all agents, when agent j has different cost coefficients, (cp2 , ch2) 6=
(cp1 , ch1). We test target agents j ∈ {1,2,3,4}, such that the holding and shortage costs are (5,1), (5,0), (5,0),
and (5,0) for agents 1 to 4, respectively. In all of these tests, the source and target agents have the same
action spaces. All agents attain cost values close to the BS cost; in fact, the overall average cost is 6.16%
higher than the BS cost.
In addition, similar to the results of Section D.1, base agent i = 1 provides good results for all target
agents. We also performed the same tests with shortage and holding costs (10,1), (1,0), (1,0), and (1,0) for
agents 1 to 4, respectively, and obtained very similar results.
D.3. Transfer Knowledge for Different Size of Action Space
Increasing the size of the action space should increase the accuracy of the d+x approach. However, it makes
the training process harder. It can be effective to train an agent with a small action space and then transfer
the knowledge to an agent with a larger action space. To test this, we test target-agent j ∈ {1,2,3,4} with
action space {−5, . . . ,5}, assuming that the source and target agents have the same cost coefficients.
Figure 13 shows the best results achieved for all agents. All agents attained costs that are close to the BS
cost, with an average gap of approximately 10.66%.
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Figure 13 Results of transfer learning for agents with |A1| 6= |A2|, (cjp1 , cjh1) = (cjp2 , c
j
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)
(a) Case 1-3-1 (b) Case 2-3-2 (c) Case 3-4-2 (d) Case 4-2-1
Figure 14 Results of transfer learning for agents with |A1| 6= |A2|, (cjp1 , cjh1) 6= (cjp2 , c
j
h2
),D1 6=D2, and pi1 6= pi2
(a) Case 1-3-1 (b) Case 2-3-3 (c) Case 3-2-1 (d) Case 4-3-2
D.4. Transfer Knowledge for Different Action Space, Cost Coefficients, and Demand
Distribution
This case includes all difficulties of the cases in Sections D.1, D.2, D.3, and 4.3, in addition to the demand
distributions being different. So, the range of demand, IL, OO, AS, and AO that each agent observes is
different than those of the base agent. Therefore, this is a hard case to train, and the average optimality
gap is 17.41%; however, as Figure 14 depicts, the cost values decrease quickly and the training noise is quite
small.
D.5. Transfer Knowledge for Different Action Space, Cost Coefficients, Demand
Distribution, and pi2
Figures 15 and 16 show the results of the most complex transfer learning cases that we tested. Although the
DQN plays with non-rational co-players and the observations in each state might be quite noisy, there are
relatively small fluctuations in the training, and for all agents after around 40,000 iterations they converge.
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Figure 15 Results of transfer learning for agents with |A1| 6= |A2|, (cjp1 , cjh1) 6= (cjp2 , c
j
h2
),D1 6=D2, and pi1 6= pi2
(a) Case 1-1-1 (b) Case 2-1-3 (c) Case 3-1-1 (d) Case 4-1-1
Figure 16 Results of transfer learning for agents with |A1| 6= |A2|, (cjp1 , cjh1) 6= (cjp2 , c
j
h2
),D1 6=D2, and pi1 6= pi2
(a) Case 1-2-1 (b) Case 2-1-2 (c) Case 3-3-3 (d) Case 4-1-1
Appendix E: Pseudocode of the Beer Game Simulator
The DQN algorithm needs to interact with the environment, so that for each state and action, the
environment should return the reward and the next state. We simulate the beer game environment using
Algorithm 2. In addition to the notation defined earlier, the algorithm also uses the following notation:
dt: The demand of the customer in period t.
OSti : Outbound shipment from agent i (to agent i− 1) in period t.
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Algorithm 2 Beer Game Simulator Pseudocode
1: procedure playGame
2: Set T randomly, and t= 0, Initialize IL0i for all agents, AO
t
i = 0,AS
t
i = 0,∀i, t
3: while t≤ T do
4: AO
t+l
fi
i
i + = d
t . set the retailer’s arriving order to external demand
5: for i= 1 : 4 do . loop through stages downstream to upstream
6: get action ati . choose order quantity
7: OOt+1i =OO
t
i + a
t
i . update OOi
8: AO
t+l
fi
i
i+1 + = a
t
i . propagate order upstream
9: end for
10: AS
t+ltr4
4 + = a
t
4 . set manufacturer’s arriving shipment to its order quantity
11: for i= 4 : 1 do . loop through stages upstream to downstream
12: ILt+1i = IL
t
i +AS
t
i . receive inbound shipment
13: OOt+1i −=ASti . update OOi
14: current Inv = max{0, ILt+1i } . determine outbound shipment
15: current BackOrder = max{0,−ILti}
16: OSti = min{ current Inv, current BackOrder + AOti }
17: AS
t+ltri
i−1 + =OS
t
i . propagate order downstream
18: ILt+1i −=AOti . update ILi
19: cti = c
p
i max{−ILt+1i ,0}+ chi max{ILt+1i ,0} . calculate cost
20: end for
21: t+ = 1
22: end while
23: end procedure
